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ABSTRACT. This study examined the relationship between executive stock ownership and the
financial performance of firms in the hospitality industry. The study sample included 30 public
hospitality companies listed on NASDAQ, all of which had 14 years of complete financial data.
The study used the Pearson correlation and linear regression analysis to test the relationship
in the hotel segment, the restaurant segment, and the combined hospitality segment. The
results show there is no statistically significant positive relationship between executive stock
ownership and firm profit in the hotel segment, whereas in the restaurant segment, there is a
negative linear relationship. Furthermore, the combined 30 hospitality companies show a
slight negative linear relationship. The findings neither support the “Agency Theory,” nor
reveal a clear correlation between executive stock ownership and the profit performance of
firms in the hospitality group.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1930s, the conflict of interest
inherent between managers and shareholders
within a public company, also known as the
agency problem, has been studied extensively
by both academic and business researchers
(Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999).
In recent years, studies have focused on
examining whether there is a relationship
between executive stock ownership and a
firm’s financial performance. Most of the
studies typically rely on analyzing subsamples
of the Fortune 500 companies (Sundaramurthy,
Rhoades, & Rechner, 2005). There has been
very little research on this subject focused on
the hospitality industry, and there is no clear
evidence in the wider literature that companies
can perform better financially when their
executives own stock in the company. One
view, the convergence-of-interest effect,
suggests that the greater the percentage of
stock ownership by managers, the better the
firm’s financial performance will be, because
the interests of managers and shareholders will
be aligned. The other view, the entrenchment
effect, suggests that the greater the percentage
of ownership by managers, the worse the firm’s
financial performance, because managers
become insulated from market forces and
consequently, with their significant voting
power, can make decisions that only further
their interests.
This study aimed to provide more empirical
evidence about the link between executive
stock ownership and financial performance in
the hospitality industry. The most recent study
on the subject, by Chen, Huo, and Lee (2012),
examined quarterly financial performance data
for seven publicly traded hotel companies in
Taiwan. In this work, a total of 30 U.S.
companies were studied with 10 from the
hotel sector and 20 from the restaurant sector.
The study analyzed 30 public hospitality
corporations using the pretax profit margin
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(PPM; percentage of pretax income to total
revenue) as the financial indicator and the
percentage of executive-owned stock value
(%OS) as the ownership indicator.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Chen et al. (2012) studied the impact of
managerial ownership on the financial perform-
ance of Taiwanese tourist hotel companies from
1997–2009. They differentiated between man-
agers and directors and the percentages of their
shareholdings in the companies. Given that
Taiwanese company managers tend to wield a
significantly high power within their firms,
sometimes to the detriment of shareholders,
their study expected to find strong links between
managerial ownership and financial perform-
ance. Their study found that hotel financial
performance improves with insider stock owner-
ship up to a point, and beyond that, increases in
ownership results in deteriorating financial
performance. In their study, both the conver-
gence of interest and entrenchment effect were
evident. In an earlier study, McConnell and
Servaes (1990) similarly found that firm perform-
ance first increases with increased managerial
stockownership; however, beyonda certain level
of ownership, performance begins to decline.
Collett (2006) also concluded from his paper that
CEO ownership is positively related to operating
performance.
Dahya, Lonie, and Power (1998) studied
2,643 UK firms and concluded that the strategy
of aligning shareholder interests with manage-
rial interests through managerial stock owner-
ship might come with inherent dangers. Their
study found that poor firm financial perform-
ance leading to executive dismissals was more
frequent in companies in which the executives
held 1% or less of the stock; however, when
executives owned more than 1%, then they
became entrenched and their dismissals were
less frequent.
Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) also con-
ducted a meta–analysis to test the effects of
executive and institutional ownership on firm
performance, and they found a positive
relationship between the two. Mura’s study
(2007) also concluded that “an increase in
director’s share ownership is associated with
improving performance at low and at very high
levels of ownership.”
Several recent studies have indicated that
there is no relationship between executive
ownership and firms’ financial performance.
The study by Loderer and Martin (1997)
showed that there is no evidence that larger
stockholding by executives will lead to better
financial performance of the firm. The study
indicated that management is constrained by
competition in the marketplace and further
emphasizes the point that it is not always
necessary for management to own stocks in
order to gain a financial benefit from the
company. Demsetz and Villalonga’s (2001)
study about the ownership structure and firm
performance also concluded that there is no
statistically significant relation between the two.
This is complemented by the Himmelberg et al.
(1999) study about the link between manage-
rial ownership and performance that concluded
that changes in managerial ownership do not
affect firm performance.
However, there is also a third viewpoint of
this theme. Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2001)
research suggested that CEOs would not
perform better when they have higher rewards.
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) con-
cluded in a separate study using Ghanaian
companies that when the CEO also doubles as
Chairman of the Board of the company this
impacts negatively on the firm’s performance.
By examining a sample of 105 London Stock
Exchange firms, Young (1998) pointed out that
higher level of managerial ownership impacts
companies in two ways: on one hand, higher
managerial ownership can impact the company
performance in a positive way because of the
alignment of the interests of the shareholderswith
those of the management; on the other hand, it
can also “serve to entrench managers, making
their removal more difficult when their perform-
ance falls below some predetermined level”
(p. 1121). McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2008)
studied the relationship between insider owner-
ship and its impactonfirmvalue. They concluded
that insider ownership can increase firm value to
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a point after which additional ownership actually
reduces firm value, confirming a curvilinear
relationship between insider ownership and firm
value. Similarly, Weber and Dudney (2003) also
concluded that there is dual causality between
CEO ownership and firm value.
METHODOLOGY
The sample consisted of 10 public hotel
companies and 20 public restaurant compa-
nies. Annual data from the fiscal years
beginning 2000 and ending 2013 of each
company was obtained from Factset and
analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS) software. The dependent
variable was the PPM, calculated by dividing
pretax income by annual total sales. The
independent variable was executive ownership
percentage (%OS) from each of the 14 years,
which is the aggregated individual ownership
for each year without insider/stock ownership
value and excluding the portions of trustee,
private investor firms, subsidiaries, and so forth.
The analysis was conducted using the
Pearson correlation to summarize the associ-
ation between the %OS and the PPM. It is
reported in several related researches that
differences in firm size and scale could affect
the results (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Kole,
1995), thus, using %OS alongwith PPM, instead
of the absolute values of both indicators, avoids
the scale and size problems.
The analysis was conducted along three
dimensions:
1. Data was separated into three categories:
hotel companies segment, restaurant
companies segment, and combined hos-
pitality companies segment, which
included both hotel and restaurant
segments. Each segment had two groups
of variables: %OS and PPM.
2. Pearson correlation and linear regression
were conducted to analyze the two
groups of variables of each segment,
respectively, and determine whether a
relationship exists between the two
variables within each segment.
3. The results were compared among the
three industry segments.
RESULTS
1. Demographics of the sample:
a. The majority of %OS of the hotel
companies fell between 0% and 10%,
whereas the majority of PPM fell
between 210% and 10% (see Appen-
dix 1).
b. The majority of %OS of the restaurant
companies was between 0% and 10%,
whereas the majority of PPM was
between0%and15% (seeAppendix2).
c. In the combined subsample of hotel
and restaurant companies, the majority
of %OS fell between 0% and 10%,
whereas the majority of PPM was
between0%and10% (seeAppendix3).
d. To make these three segments compar-
able to one another, each segment is
subcategorized into five groups based
on percentage of the ownership from
highest to lowest, as is shown in Table 1.
2. Pearson Correlation & Linear Regression
results:
Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation and
linear regression results for the three
segments.
TABLE 1. Each Segment Category Based on Percentage of
Executive Ownership
Group Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
%OS .40% 31%–40% 21%–30% 11%–20% #10%
TABLE 2. Pearson Correlation and Linear Regression Results
Pearson Correlation
Linear Regression
F t Sig.
Seg-1 .062 .533 .730 .467
Seg-2 2 .212 14.465 23.803 .000
Seg-3 2 .086 3.332 21.825 .069
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a. The hotel companies segment (Seg-
1):
As shown in Table 2, for the hotels
group, the Pearson correlation figure
is 0.062, suggesting that the relation-
ship between the two variables is
very weak. The linear regression
result shows a t-value of 0.730 and
a significance of 0.467, showing no
linear association between executive
ownership and firms’ performance
on profit.
b. The restaurant companies segment
(Seg-2):
This segment’s Pearson correlation
value is 20.212, suggesting that the
relationship between the two vari-
ables is negative. It shows that for the
restaurant group, the higher the %
OS, the lower the firm’s financial
performance. Linear regression
shows a t-value of 23.803 and a
significance of 0.000, indicating a
strong and significant negative linear
relationship between executive own-
ership and firm performance on
profit. It shows clearly that, for the
restaurant companies, the increase of
the %OS leads to a decrease of the
firms’ PPMs.
c. The combined hospitality companies
segment (Seg-3):
The Pearson correlation value for
this segment is 20.086, showing a
negative but very weak relationship
between executive ownership and
firm performance for all the 30
companies as a whole. Although the
hotel company segment shows a
slightly positive linear relation
between the two variables, the
restaurant segment has a stronger
negative linear relationship in com-
parison, so the combined segment
shows a negative direction. The linear
regression results are similar to the
correlation results; the t-value is
FIGURE 1. The pretax profit margin (PPM) performance of each group within hotel segment. Note. OS ¼ ownership.
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21.825 with a significance of 0.069,
suggesting a negative relationship
between the variables that is not
significant.
3. The PPM Performance:
a. The hotel companies segment (Seg-1):
There were 10 hotel companies
representing the hotel segment and
they were sorted into 5 groups based
on their %OS (see Table 1). In all 10
companies, there was no hotel with
40% or more in %OS, so Group 1 had
no hotels. Group 2, with %OS
between 31% and 40%, the average
PPM for these companies was barely
above 0%. In Groups 3 (21%–30%)
and 4 (11%–20%), the PPM were
positive and strong (see Figure 1).
Among all five groups, Group 3 (%
OS between 21% and 30%) shows a
comparably stable and positive per-
formance inPPM,whichdemonstrates
that when the executives hold
between 21% and 30% stocks in their
companies, they are more likely to
make positive decisions that benefit
the companies.
The Group 5 companies (%OS less
than 10%) in the graph show both
extreme high and low PPM figures; no
distinct pattern of PPM exists. This
suggests that when executives have
very small stock ownership the com-
pany’s PPM is unpredictable. For
example, Intercontinental Hotel
Group’s executives have no stock
ownership in the company, however
the company’s PPM is quite high.
b. The restaurant companies segment
(Seg-2):
Figure 2 shows the PPM perform-
ance for each group in the restaurant
segment.
From Figure 2, Group 1 (%OS
higher than 40%) shows a fair and
stable positive performance pattern in
PPM. There are fewer companies in
FIGURE 2. The pretax profit margin (PPM) performance of each group within the restaurant segment. Note. OS ¼ ownership.
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the second group (%OS between 31%
and 40%), and it shows both positive
and negative PPMs.
InGroup3 (%OSbetween21%and
30%),more companies have a positive
profit figure than a negative one.
Companies in Group 4 (%OS of 11%
to 20%) have a significantly negative
PPM. In Group 5, where companies’
executives have less than 10% of the
company’s stock, the PPM is signifi-
cantly negative and positive.
c. The combined hospitality companies
segment (Seg-3):
Figure 3 shows the PPM perform-
ance for each group in the combined
hospitality segment.
From Figure 3, the majority of
executive ownership in Group 5
(0%–10%) ranges from 0% to 10%
with a strong positive as well as
negative PPM. For the most part,
Group 4 hospitality companies show
more of a negative PPM compared to
the rest of the groups. Group 3 has a
higher %OS and also exhibits positive
PPM. The figure clearly shows that
only very few of these companies
show a slight negative profit perform-
ance. Group 2 displays both a slight
positive and negative profit perform-
ance. Finally, Group 1 is the only
segment in which the hospitality
companies show no negative PPM
with a minor positive profit figure.
DISCUSSION
The results for both Pearson correlation and
linear regression analysis of the relationship
between executive stock ownership and
corporate financial performance in hotels
indicates no significant association; however,
for the restaurant companies the relationship is
linear, negative, and significant. When the hotel
and restaurant companies are combined, the
relationship between the variables is negative
but not significant.
FIGURE 3. The pretax profit margin (PPM) performance of each group within the combined hospitality segment. Note. OS ¼ ownership.
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For all three segments, the results indicate
that the higher the ownership (shown in Group 1
with the %OS higher than 40%), the less drastic
thedecisions are that theexecutivesmake.When
executives own more corporate stock, they tend
to stabilize their personal equity rather thanmake
risky decisions that might lead to negative
financial performance. Nevertheless, the hotel
segment has no companies in this group, which
means that compared to restaurant companies,
executives of hotel corporations usually hold no
more than 40% of a company’s total stock.
Companies that are in Group 5, with executive
ownership less than 10%, show both extreme
high and low PPMs, which means their pretax
profit is very unpredictable. This result indicates
that issuing a small number of stocks to executives
could encourage them to be either fearless
about making risky decisions or insufficiently
motivated to improve their company’s financial
performance.
For the hotel segment, companies with
21%–30% of executive stock ownership have
the most stable financial performance, whereas
for the restaurant segment, companies with
executive ownership above 40% of corporate
stocks in total have a fairly positive PPM.
However, in general, hotel companies show a
more stable performance than restaurants, and
this can be seen in Figure 1 where there is
hardly any contrast in the PPM of the groups,
with the exception of Group 5.
For restaurant companies in the sample, the
highest %OS for a company reached 65%, and
the group with higher than 40% executive
ownership is also large.
CONCLUSION
In the sample of hospitality companies in
this study, the relationship between executive
stock ownership and pretax profit margin of
hotel companies is different from that of
restaurant companies. Hotel companies show
a very weak relationship, whereas the restau-
rant companies show a strong negative
relationship, that is, the higher the executive
ownership percentage, the lower the pretax
profit performance of the company. In total, all
30 companies appear to have a slightly negative
relationship between the two variables.
These results reflect the two viewpoints
from previous studies, which show no relation-
ship or a negative relationship between the
two. This also suggests that eliminating the
agency problem by issuing company executives
more stock might not yield the desired result in
the hospitality industry.
Regarding limitations, this study was
conducted by analyzing a sample of only 30
public hospitality companies in total over a 14-
year period (2000–2013). The study could be
improved by expanding the sample and the
annual data to extend the period of time or use
quarterly profit data to increase the number of
observations.
The executive stock ownership that is
analyzed with respect to the pretax profit
margin does not take into account the number
of executives among whom the stock is
distributed. For example, in the fiscal year of
2013, approximately 22.7% of Marriott Inter-
national Inc.’s stock was owned by 36
executives, whereas in Red Lion Hotels
Group, 30 executive stockholders own only
about 7.42% of the whole company’s stock.
This variance in stock ownership can lead to
significant differences in the type of decisions
executives make on behalf of their companies
to achieve profitability. The theory by Hambrick
and Mason (1984) states that“organizational
outcomes—strategic choices and performance
levels—are partially predicted by managerial
background characteristics” (p. 193).
In this study, the financial performance of a
firm is examined using only the PPM, which
overlooks the impact of other important
variables that capture the financial success of
a company and its stockholders. Other financial
indicators could be used in additional studies to
validate the results of this research.
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APPENDIX 1
Demographic of the Sample
Segment 1: The hotel companies segment
(10 companies).
Segment 2: The restaurant companies seg-
ment (20 companies).
FIGURE A1. The frequency of the ownership (OS) percentage of
hotel companies segment.
FIGURE A2. The frequency of the pretax profit margin (PPM) of
hotel companies segment.
FIGURE A3. The frequency of the ownership (OS) percentage of
restaurant companies segment.
FIGURE A4. The frequency of the pretax profit margin (PPM) of
restaurant companies segment.
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Segment 3: The combined hospitality com-
panies segment (30 companies).
APPENDIX 2
Pearson Correlation Results
Segment 1: The hotel companies segment
(10 companies).
Segment 2: The restaurant companies seg-
ment (20 companies).
Segment 3: The hospitality companies seg-
ment (30 companies).
FIGURE A5. The frequency of the ownership (OS) percentage of
all hospitality companies segment.
FIGURE A6. The frequency of the pretax profit margin (PPM) of
total hospitality companies segment.
TABLE A1. Pearson Correlation Result for Hotel Companies
Segment
Correlations
OS PPM
OS Pearson Correlation 1 .062
Sig. (2-tailed) .467
N 140 140
PPM Pearson Correlation .062 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .467
N 140 140
Note. OS ¼ ownership; PPM ¼ pretax profit margin.
TABLE A2. Pearson Correlation Result for Restaurant Companies
Segment
Correlations
OS PPM
OS Pearson Correlation 1 2 .212**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 308 308
PPM Pearson Correlation 2 .212** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 308 308
Note. OS ¼ ownership; PPM ¼ pretax profit margin.
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
TABLE A3. Pearson Correlation Result for Hospitality Companies
Segment
Correlations
OS PPM
OS Pearson Correlation 1 2 .086
Sig. (2-tailed) .069
N 448 448
PPM Pearson Correlation 2 .086 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .069
N 448 448
Note. OS ¼ ownership; PPM ¼ pretax profit margin.
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APPENDIX 3
Linear Regression Results
Segment 1: The hotel companies segment (10 companies).
Segment 2: The restaurant companies segment (20 companies).
TABLE A5. Linear Regression Result for Restaurant Companies Segment
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression .083 1 .083 14.465 .000b
Residual 1.761 306 .006
Total 1.844 307
Coefficientsc
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) .076 .005 14.886 .000
OS 2 .001 .000 2 .212 2 3.803 .000
Note. ANOVA ¼ analysis of variance, OS ¼ ownership.
a Dependent Variable: Pretax Profit Margin.
b Predictors: (Constant), OS.
c Dependent Variable: Pretax Profit Margin.
TABLE A4. Linear Regression Result for Hotel Companies Segment
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .015 1 .015 .533 .467b
1 Residual 3.808 138 .028
Total 3.823 139
Coefficientsc
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) .076 .018 4.301 .000
OS .001 .001 .062 .730 .467
Note. ANOVA ¼ analysis of variance, OS ¼ ownership.
a Dependent Variable: Pretax Profit Margin.
b Predictors: (Constant), OS
cDependent Variable: Pretax Profit Margin.
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Segment 3: The combined hospitality companies segment (30 companies).
TABLE A6. Linear Regression Result for Combined Hospitality Companies Segment
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 422.709 1 422.709 3.332 .069b
Residual 56580.454 446 126.862
Total 57003.162 447
Coefficientsc
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 7.797 .638 12.213 .000
OS 2 .083 .045 2 .086 21.825 .069
Note ANOVA ¼ analysis of variance, OS ¼ ownership.
a Dependent Variable: Pretax Profit Margin.
b Predictors: (Constant), OS
cDependent Variable: Pretax Profit Margin.
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